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LeMoine: LeMoine: Changing Interpretations of the Establishment Clause:

Changing Interpretations of the
Establishment Clause:
Financial Support of Religious Schools
Jackson v. Benson'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wolman v. Walter, Justice Stevens voiced concem that the "'high and
impregnable' wall between church and state, has been reduced to a 'blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier.' 2 The court had sacrificed predictability for
flexibility? While this may be true in some areas of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, it is no longer true in cases involving benefits to religious

organizations. If the programs equally benefit both secular and "similarly
situated" religious organizations, there is no violation of the Establishment
Clause.4 Jackson v. Benson is an expression of this view. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in upholding a program designed to provide tuition money to
students attending private schools, followed the United States Supreme Court's
most recent expressions in this area and reached a result that it felt was in accord
with the Court's present view of the Establishment Clause. It appears that the
Wisconsin court was right, for the Supreme Court recently decided not to grant
5
certiorari.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1988, the Wisconsin legislature enacted the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program (MPCP). 6 This program provided that a certain percentage of
students within the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) could attend private, non-

1. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
2. 433 U.S. 229, 266 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
4. See Carl H. Esbeck, Government Regulation of Religiously Based Social
Services: The FirstAmendment Considerations,19 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 343, 355-58
(1992).
5. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
6. Wis. STAT. § 119.23 (1988). The original program was challenged in Davis v.
Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992). The Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Davis: (1)
"the original program, when enacted, was not a private or local bill and therefore was not
subject to the prohibitions of WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 18" which prohibits such bills from
embracing more than one subject; (2) "the program did not violate the uniformity clause
in WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 because the private schools did not constitute 'district schools'
simply by participating in the program"; and (3) the program "served a sufficient public
purpose and therefore did not violate the public purpose doctrine." Jackson, 578 N.W.2d
at 608. See also Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 465-77.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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sectarian schools, paid for by Wisconsin.' The legislature placed eligibility
requirements on the students and schools participating in the program and
required the "State Superintendent of Public Instruction... to perform a number
of supervisory and reporting tasks."8 Under this program, the State disbursed
public funds directly to the private schools based upon a determination of the
cost of public schooling each student for the year. 9 The state then reduced the
amount of funds given to the MPS by the amount disbursed to the private
schools.'
The program was amended in 1995.11 The amendments removed the
requirement that the private schools involved in the program be "nonsectarian."' 2
The legislature also amended the procedure used for disbursing funds to the
private schools. Instead of paying the private schools directly, the amended
program directed payment of funds to the student's parent or guardian, who then
endorsed the check over to the private school.' 3 The amended MPCP placed no
restrictions on the private school's use of the state funds. 4 The amendments also

7. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 607.
8. Id. at 608. The court stated that:
To be eligible for the original MPCP, a student (1) had to be a student in
kindergarten through twelfth grade; (2) had to be from a family whose income
did not exceed 1.75 times the federal poverty level; and (3) had to be either
enrolled in a public school in Milwaukee, attending a private school under
this program, or not enrolled in school the previous year ... [A] private
school had to comply with the anti-discrimination provisions imposed by 42
U.S.C. § 2000d and all health and safety laws or codes that apply to
Wisconsin public school. The school additionally had to meet on an annual
basis defined performance criteria and had to submit to the State certain
financial and performance audits.
Id. (citations omitted).
9. Id.
10. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998). For example, the amount paid to the schools through the parents/guardians was
$2500 per student for the 1994-95 school year. Eight hundred students participated in
the program during that year, attending 12 different nonsectarian schools. The following
year, the number of students doubled to 1600 and the number of participating private
schools rose to 17. Id.
11. Wis. STAT. § 119.23 (1988), amended by 1995 Wis. Act 27 §§ 4002-4009.
12. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 607-08. The legislature also increased the percentage
of students eligible for the program to 15% of the Milwaukee Public School membership.
The State Superintendent's responsibilities were also reduced. Id. at 608-09.
13. Id. at 609. The new amendments allowed the "State [to] pay [to the parent or
guardian] the lesser of the MPS per student state aid under Wis. Stat. § 121.08 or the
private school's 'operating and debt service cost per pupil that is related to educational
programming' as determined by the state." Id.
14. Id. The legislature also removed the percentage cap on the amount of students
participating in the program enrolled at one school. Previously, no more than 65% of a
school's
enrollment could consist of MPCP students. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/6
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"added an 'opt-out' provision prohibiting a private school from requiring 'a

student attending the private school under [the MPCP] to participate in any
religious activity if the pupil's parent or guardian submits to the teacher or the
private school's principal a written request that the pupil be exempt from such
activities..""..

The plaintiffs filed two separate suits in August 1995 challenging the
amended MPCP under the Establishment Clause, various provisions of
the
7
6
Wisconsin state constitution,' and Wisconsin's public purpose doctrine.'
In response, the State filed a petition with the Wisconsin Supreme Court
seeking a preliminary declaration that the program was constitutional. 8 Instead,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court enjoined Wisconsin from implementing the
amendments to the MPCP, but allowed the original program to continue.' The
court split on the constitutionality of the program, dismissed the case, and
remanded it to the circuit court.20
The circuit court lifted the preliminary injunction ordered by the Supreme
Court, except with respect to the provision allowing the participation of sectarian

schools. The circuit court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
and denied the State's motion for summary judgment, declaring the amendments
to the program unconstitutional under Wisconsin law. The circuit court did not
address whether the program violated the Federal Constitution.2'

15. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998).
16. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 607, 623 (referring to Wis. CoNsT. art. IV, § 18). The
suit claimed that the amended MPCP violated Wisconsin's state constitutional
prohibition barring the enaction of private or local bills "embracing more than one
subject." It also claimed that the amended MPCP violated the uniformity provision of
WIS. CONST.art. X, § 3 requiring that district (public) schools be "as nearly uniform as
practicable," free of charge, and without "sectarian instruction." Id. at 607, 627.
17. The public purpose doctrine, "although not recited in any specific clause in the
state constitution, is a well-established constitutional doctrine" requiring that "[p]ublic
funds may be expended only for public purposes. An expenditure of public funds for
other than a public purpose would be abhorrent to the constitution of Wisconsin." Id. at
628. Other parties subsequently joined the suit. Id. at 609. Significantly, on August 15,
1996, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) filed
suit claiming that the amended MPCP violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Wisconsin constitution.
The NAACP also filed a motion to "consolidate the cases." The circuit court did so, but
"bifurcated the proceedings so that the equal protection claims would be heard only if the
amended MPCP was upheld." Id.
18. Id.
19. Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407, 415 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
20. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998).

21. Id. at 609-10.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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The State appealed from this order to the court of appeals.22 The court
of appeals struck down the entire amended MPCP as violating Wisconsin's
"prohibition against state expenditures for the benefit of religious societies or
seminaries."23 Like the circuit court, the court of appeals decided the case on
state law grounds. 24
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the amended MPCP under
the Federal Establishment Clause and the named provisions of the Wisconsin
constitution. The court reasoned that the program "will not have the primary
effect of advancing religion, and it will not lead to excessive entanglement
between the State and participating sectarian private schools."25
HI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Establishment Clause has been thoroughly analyzed in both case law

and law reviews.26 For purposes of this Note, however, it is not useful to
consider the complete history of the Establishment Clause; however, a
discussion of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of state aid to private
schools serves as a useful background to illumine the Jackson v. Benson
decision.
It is probably an overstatement to refer to a "test" used by the Court for
analyzing Establishment Clause cases. Given Justice Stevens comment that the
Establishment Clause is a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier, ' 27 and the
Court's admission that Establishment Clause jurisprudence has "sacrifice[d]

22. Id. at 610.
23. Id. Note that the court of appeals did not reach the federal constitutional issues.
24. Id.
25. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 610-11 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
466 (1998). This is a very simple statement of the holding. The court's holding should
actually be expressed in six parts, and Part IV of this Note will be structured in the
manner articulated by the court in its opinion. See id. at 607.
26. See Andrew A. Adams, Cleveland,School Choice, and "Laws Respecting An
EstablishmentofReligion," 2 TEx. REV. L & POL. 165 (1997); Peter M. Kimball, Opening
the Door to School Choice in Wisconsin: Is Agostini v. Felton the Key?, 81 MARQ. L.

REV. 843 (1998); Harlan A. Loeb & Debbie N. Kaminer, God, Money, and Schools:
Voucher ProgramsImpugn the Separationof Church and State, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
1 (1996); George M. Macchia, New Jersey and School Vouchers: Perfect Together.
Tuition Vouchers May Provide Interim Relief to New Jersey's Urban School Children
8 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 507 (1998); Arval A. Morris, Public EducationalServices in
Religious Schools: An Opening Wedge for Vouchers?, 122 EDUC. L. REP. 545 (1998);
Margaret A. Nero, The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program: Why Voucher
Programs Do Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 58 OHIO ST. L. J. 1103 (1997);
Kristin K. Waggoner, The Milwaukee ParentalChoice Program: The First Voucher
System to Include Religious Schools, 7 REGENT U. L. REv. 165 (1996).
27. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 266 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/6
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clarity and predictability for flexibility, ' 28 the "test" articulated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman29 is really only a set of principles that the Court considers when
determining compliance with the Establishment Clause." However, the Court
continues to use the Lemon test as the primary vehicle for determining whether
a state statute unconstitutionally infringes upon religion.3'
A. The Pre-Lemon Era
Everson v. Board of Education32 marks the beginning of the Court's
treatment of state programs attempting to assist religious schools. Everson
upheld a New Jersey program which provided transportation for students
attending both private parochial and public schools. 33 In doing so, the Court
articulated its then current philosophy towards Establishment Clause analysis:
While we do not mean to intimate that a state could not provide
transportation only to children attending public schools, we must be
careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against stateestablished churches, to be sure that we ado not inadvertently prohibit
New Jersey from extending its general State law benefits to all its
citizens without regard to their religious belief. . . . [The First]
Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the
state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to
handicap religions, than it is to favor them.34
The Court concluded that while the wall between church and state "must be kept
high and impregnable," this law providing transportation to both public and
nonpublic school students did not violate the First Amendment.35

28. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662
(1980).
29. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
30. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). "With full recognition that
[the Lemon principles] are no more than helpful signposts, we consider the present statute
and the proposed transaction in terms of the three 'tests': purpose, effect, and
entanglement." Id. at 741.
31. Agostini v. Felton, 501 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997). The Agostini Court stated:
"To summarize, New York City's Title I program does not run afoul of any of three
primary criteria we currently use to evaluate whether government aid has the effect of
advancing religion. ..." Id. The Court then articulated the three principles found in the
Lemon test. Id.
32. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 16, 18.
35. Id. at 18.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 6
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 64

Twenty-three years later, the Court decided Walz v. Tax Commission.36
Walz challenged on First Amendment grounds property tax exemptions given
to religious organizations for religious properties.37 In Walz, the Court began its
analysis with a threshold question: Does the tax exemption sponsor religion?3 8
The Court divided its analysis of this question into two parts: (1) What was the
legislative purpose; and (2) Was the effect of the law an excessive entanglement
between church and state. 39 This analysis formed the basis for the Lemon test,
even though the Court in Walz relied heavily on historical considerations rather
than merely discussing the above framework.40

B. The Lemon Test
The Supreme Court formulated the Lemon test based on its belief that the
Establishment Clause was designed to avoid three main evils: "sponsorship,"
"financial support," and "active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity."'4' Turning to each, the Court stated: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the42statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'
Lemon v. Kurtzman involved Establishment Clause challenges to
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes. 43 The Pennsylvania statute provided
private elementary and secondary schools with state reimbursement of costs
associated with the teaching of certain secular subjects. 44 The Rhode Island
statute subsidized fifteen percent of private school teachers' salaries. 45 Both
programs provided such reimbursements to religious schools as well. 46 The
Supreme Court held that both programs were invalid under the Establishment

36. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).

37. Id. at 666. Even though this case does not deal with state benefits to religious
schools, it is helpful background to Lemon. The case also shows that the Court, prior to
Lemon, was friendlier to state programs benefitting religious institutions.
38. Id. at 674.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 677-79.
41. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
42. Id. at 612-13 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
43. Id. at 606.
44. Id. at 606-07. The schools were reimbursed for teachers' salaries, textbooks,
and instructional materials. Id. at 607.
45. Id.
46. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/6
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Clause, 47 despite the Court's recognition of the valuable contribution of such
church-related schools to the nation as a whole. The Court stated:
The merits and benefits of these schools, however, are not the issue
before us in these cases. The sole question is whether state aid to
these schools can be squared with the dictates of the Religion Clauses.
Under our system the choice has been made that government is to be
entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches
excluded from the affairs of government. The Constitution decrees
that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family,
and the institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement
and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn."
Justice Douglas, concurring in the opinion, stated his view more strongly:
It matters not that the teacher receiving taxpayers' money only teaches
religion a fraction of the time. Nor does it matter that he or she
teaches no religion. The school is an organism living on one budget.
What the taxpayers give for salaries of those who teach only the
humanities or science without any trace of proselytizing enables the
school to use all of its own funds for religious training. As Judge
Coffin said, we would be blind to realities if we let 'sophisticated
bookkeeping' sanction 'almost total subsidy of a religious institution
by assigning the bulk of the institution's expenses to 'secular'
activities.' And sophisticated attempts to avoid the Constitution are
just as invalid as simple-minded ones. In my view the taxpayers'
forced contribution to the parochial schools in the present cases
violates the First Amendment.49
C. Committeefor PublicEducation & Religious Liberty v. Nyquists
In Jackson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted the striking similarities
between the MPCP and the programs at issue in Nyquist.51 In Nyquist, the
Governor of New York signed into law three different financial aid programs for
nonpublic schools. 52 The first program, entitled "Health and Safety Grants for

47. Id. at 609, 611. Specifically, the Court held that the Rhode Island and the
Pennsylvania statutes fostered an excessive entanglement between the state and religion.
Id. at 615-21.
48. Id. at 626.
49. Id. at 641-42 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
50. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
51. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 614 n.9 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
466 (1998).
413ofU.S.
at 761-62.
Published52.
by Nyquist,
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Nonpublic School Children," gave nonpublic schools direct money grants "to be
used for 'the maintenance and repair of... school facilities and equipment to
ensure the health, welfare and safety of enrolled pupils.' 53 To ensure that the
money was used properly, the program required each participating school to
audit and report its maintenance and repair expenditures for the preceding year. 4
The grant could not exceed either the reported expenses, or fifty percent of the
"average per-pupil cost for equivalent maintenance and repair services in the
55
public schools.
The second (a tuition assistance program) and third program (a tax benefit
program) both fell under the title "Elementary and Secondary Education
Opportunity Program."56 The tuition assistance program gave tuition
reimbursements to low-income parents whose children attended participating
nonpublic schools.57 The tax benefit program, enacted to give assistance to those
who did not qualify for the tuition assistance program, provided a graduated tax
deduction based upon the income ofparents with children attending nonpublic
schools.5
The Court in Nyquist struck down all three of the programs.59 The Court
set out two ground rules for Establishment Clause analysis. First, states may
give some direct aid to sectarian schools for those secular functions the schools
invariably perform.6 The Court characterized this as channeling "direct aid to
the secular without providing direct aid to the sectarian.",61 Second, "an indirect
and incidental effect beneficial to religious institutions has never
been thought
62
a sufficient defect to warrant the invalidation of a state law.,
With these rules in mind, the Court articulated its reasons for striking down
the tuition reimbursement program and the maintenance/repair program.63 The
Court held that a state may not provide funds for maintenance or repair of

53. Id. at 762.
54. Id. at 763.

55. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 763
(1973).
56. Id. at 764.
57. Id.
58. Id.at 765-66. For example, ifa taxpayer's adjusted gross income was less than

$9000, she received a $1000 deduction for up to three dependents. If a taxpayer's
adjusted gross income was less than $15,000 but more than $9000, she received a $400
deduction for each dependent attending nonpublic school. Id.

59. Id. at 769.
60. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775
(1973).
61. Id.
62. Id.

63. Id. at 776-90. The tax benefit program was struck down because it aided and
advanced religious institutions by giving assistance to parents of pupils at the schools.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/6
Id.
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buildings used for sectarian purposes.'
The Court reasoned that when
maintenance and repair funds are provided to religious schools, the sectarian
purposes of the schools are advanced in violation of the Establishment Clause.'
The Court did not dwell on the "excessive entanglement" prong of the Lemon
test because it believed that any monitoring systems placed upon the program
would constitute "too intrusive and continuing a relationship between Church
and State"66
The tuition reimbursement program also failed the Establishment Clause
analysis.6 7 New York argued that because the grants were made to parents and
not to schools, the program did not trespass the church-state barrier.' The Court
dismissed this argument as only one factor in the total analysis.6 9 The Court
found that the effect of the program was to provide "desired financial support for
nonpublic, sectarian institutions."70 The Court gave no credence to other
arguments by New York that (1) the parents have freedom to spend the grant
money on a school of their choosing;7' (2) there is therefore no guarantee that
public money will go to sectarian schools;72 (3) only a small percentage of a
student's tuition is paid for by the program; 73 and (4) the program is designed to
further the free exercise of religion. 74 Most significant for purposes of this Note
is the Court's dismissal of the first two arguments. The Court labeled the grants
a subsidy which gave parents an incentive to send their children to private
schools.7s
64. Id. at 777. The Court cites to Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), for
this proposition. In Tilton, the Court held invalid a federal statute which provided
construction grants to colleges and universities, regardless of whether they were sectarian
or nonsectarian. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 776. The statute contained a limitation which
stated that if a university used the grant to finance a facility designed to advance sectarian
purposes (e.g. a chapel), the government could recover some of the grant money. Id.
However, this limitation expired after 20 years, so nothing prevented a university from
converting a federally financed facility to advance sectarian purposes. Id. The Court in
Nyquist reasons from Tilton that "[i]f the State may not erect buildings in which religious
activities are to take place, it may not maintain such buildings or renovate them when
they fall into disrepair." Id.
65. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779-80
(1973).
66. Id. at 780 (citation omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id. at781.
69. Id. Another factor was whether the program was sufficiently restricted to
ensure separation between church and state. Id. at 783.
70. Id. at 783.
71. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 785-86
(1973).
72. Id. at 786.
73. Id. at 787.
74. Id. at 788.
75. Id. at 786.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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Nyquist attempted to "firm up" the standards for Establishment Clause
analysis.76 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stated that while the Religion
Clauses are not "free of 'entangling'

precedents. .

.

. the controlling

constitutional standards have become firmly rooted and the broad contours of
our inquiry are now well defined., 77 Powell, however, qualified his statement
by saying:
The existence, at this stage of the Court's history, of guiding principles
etched over the years is [sic] difficult cases does not, however, make
our task today an easy one. For it is evident from the numerous
opinions of the Court... that no 'bright line' guidance is afforded.
Instead, while there has been general agreement upon the applicable
principles and upon the framework of analysis, the Court has
recognized its inability to perceive with invariable clarity the 'lines of
demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional
law.' And, at least where questions of entanglements are involved, the
Court has acknowledged that, as of necessity, the 'wall' is not without

bends and may constitute a 'blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier
depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.'78
Justice Powell's qualification is instructive. The very difficulties Powell
discussed created an environment of instability in the Court's jurisprudence,
resulting in a movement
away from a no-aid separationism approach 79 to an
"evenhandedness '80 or neutrality-based approach. 81

76. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 79798 (1973).
77. Id. at 761. The wall separating church and state has not "become 'as winding
as the famous serpentine wall' [Thomas Jefferson] designed for the University of
Virginia." Id.
78. Id. at 761 n.5 (citation omitted).
79. See Carl H. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 350-51. No-aid separationism interprets
the Establishment Clause to mean "that government must doggedly avoid utilizing its
power to grant any benefits to, or incur measurable interaction with, religious

organizations."
80. Agostini v. Fulton, 521 U.S. 203, 253 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting).
81. See Carl H. Esbeck, A ConstitutionalCasefor Governmental Cooperationwith
Faith-BasedSocial Service Providers,46 EMoRY L. J. 1, 19 (1997). Esbeck points out
that the neutrality model is only followed in cases where government provides a benefit
to all persons or organizations similarly situated. Id. Both neutrality and no-aid
will be discussed at length in Part IV of this Note.
separationism
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/6
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D. A New Mission
This change in perspective occurred gradually. In Levitt v. Committeefor
PublicEducation & ReligiousLiberty,82 the Court struck down legislation which
provided reimbursement of expenses involved in administering state-mandated
testing, record-keeping, and preparation of reports for the state.83 Adhering to
Nyquist, the Court stated that the program violated the Establishment Clause in
that it provided direct money grants to sectarian schools. 84 However, a careful
reading of Levitt reveals an interesting statement by the Court. The Court says
that it was "left with no choice under Nyquist but to hold that [the program]
constitutes an impermissible aid to religion; this is so because the aid that will
be devoted to secular functions is not identifiable and separable from aid to
sectarian activities .,85 This statement cracked the door for allowing aid to
religious institutions because it narrowed the Court's focus. Instead of looking
at religious institutions as a whole-as an entity with a common purpose - the
Court divided religious institutions into segments (some clearly religious and
some more secular). Therefore, after Levitt, a program giving aid directly to
religious institutions through a mechanism ensuring that aid goes only toward
secular educational purposes would likely be upheld.
The presumption that such a program would be upheld proved true in
Committeefor Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan. 6 The program
at issue in Regan was a modified version of the one before the Court in Levitt.87
Tailoring the program to fit the requirements articulated in Levitt, the legislature
provided a means for ensuring that the state funds would only go toward paying
the costs of secular educational functions."8 While Regan upheld the modified
version of the program, 89 the Court first had to dispense with some troublesome
precedent that did not coincide with its new mission.
The Court's first task was to deal with Meek v. Pittenger. In Meek, the
Court examined a Pennsylvania program which (1) loaned textbooks to students
attending private schools,9' (2) loaned instructional material and equipment to
nonpublic schools, 92 and (3) authorized the Secretary of Education to supply
professional staff and supportive materials, equipment, and personnel to

82. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
83. Id. at 482.
84. Id. at481.
85. Id. at 480.
86. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
87. Id. at 650.
88. Id. at 651-52.
89. Id. at 650, 662.
90. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). They actually tackled this late in the opinion, but it was
necessary for them to show how Meek and Wolman could be reconciled.
91. Id. at 359-60.
at 364. of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
Published92.
byId.
University

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 6
MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. d4

nonpublic schools to perform certain services.93 A plurality of the Court upheld
the textbook loan provision of the program because it was virtually
indistinguishable from a program upheld in a previous case. 4 However, a
majority of the Court invalidated the other two portions of the program.95
According to the Court, the loaning of instructional materials to the religious
schools directly aided them in violation of Nyquist.96 The provision allowing the
Secretary of Education to send public employees into religious schools was held
invalid because "the danger that religious doctrine will become intertwined with
secular instruction persists."97 Given the "dominant sectarian mission" of the
schools, the chance that religion would be fostered through the public employees
was too great a risk to permit.98
At the district court level, the Regan program was struck down under the
reasoning of Meek.9 9 The Supreme Court in Regan effectively evaded this point

by stating that Wolman v. Walter'0 0 controlled the disposition of the case.' ' The
Court stated that Meek did not control the outcome in Regan because Meek was
to be narrowly construed. 10 2 Further, the author of Meek, who also wrote
Wolman, at no time suggested that Meek and Wolman were in conflict with each
other.0 3 This negative inference, combined with a narrow reading of Meek,

allowed the Court to state that Wolman controlled the disposition in Regan.
Wolman dealt with the same program ruled upon in Meek, except that it was
amended. The Ohio legislature, in an attempt to conform the program to the
Meek opinion, reworked and amended the statute.' The statute allowed Ohio
to provide nonpublic school students with books, "instructional materials and
equipment, standardized testing and scoring, diagnostic services, therapeutic
services, and field trip transportation."' 1 5 A majority of the Court upheld the

93. Id. at 367. The services to be performed were "remedial and accelerated
instruction, guidance counseling and testing, speech and hearing services." Id.

94. Id. at 359-60 (referring to Bd. ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)). Allen
upheld a program which loaned textbooks directly to students attending nonpublic
schools. The Court in Allen rejected an argument that such a program would provide an
incentive for children to attend religious private schools because a textbook loan program
alone does not "demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for a religious
institution." Meek, 421 U.S. at 360 (discussing Allen).
95. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 373.

96. Id. at 364-65.
97. Id. at 370.
98. Id. at 371-72.
99. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 652

(1980).
100. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
101. Regan, 444 U.S. at 654.
102. Id. at 661-62.
103. Id. at 661.
104. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 232-34.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/6
105. Id. at 233.
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provision of "diagnostic services, and therapeutic and remedial services" at the
nonpublic schools,"° but struck down the provision of instructional materials,
equipment, and transportation
for field trips. 0 7 A plurality of the Court upheld
10 8
loans.
the textbook
Based upon Wolman, the Court in Regan upheld the reimbursement of the
religious and secular nonpublic schools for costs associated with state-mandated
testing and reporting services.' 9 The Court held that: (1) the religious schools
no longer had any control over the content or grading of the examinations;"0 (2)
the reimbursements for record-keeping and reporting were constitutional under
the Lemon test;"' and (3) the program did not have the overall effect of
"advancing the sectarian aims of the nonpublic schools.""' 2
E. Neutrality andIndirectness
The Regan decision in 1980 set the tone for the next decade and a half. The
Court continued to move away from its decision in Nyquist toward a less
separationist view of the Establishment Clause. Significantly, the Court utilized
the second prong of the Lemon test (whether or not a program has the primary
effect of advancing religion) to effect the greatest movement.
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the Court increasingly relied on a
two-part test for discerning whether a program had the primary effect of
advancing religion.13 First, the Court asked if a program was neutral.1 4 The
Court extensively discussed neutrality in Mueller v. Allen."' Mueller involved
a lawsuit over a Minnesota statute allowing taxpayers to deduct some expenses
associated with sending their children to school, irrespective of whether the
children attended public or private, sectarian or non-sectarian, school." 6 These7
expenses included the cost of tuition, books, and transportation."
Distinguishing the Minnesota statute from the program at issue in Nyquist, the
Court upheld the statute because: (1) it was facially neutral in that it provided

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 255.
Id.
Id. at 255-66.
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 656

(1980).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 656-62.

112. Id. at 662.
113. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 614 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998).
114. Id. at 614 n. 8 (citing Walz v. Tax Comn'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970)).
115. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).

116. Id. at 390.
117. Id. at 391.
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the benefit to parents of children attending both public and nonpublic schools," 8
(2) the assistance to sectarian schools was indirect as the schools were only
benefitted following numerous private choices by the parents," 9 and (3) the fact
that the majority of persons taking advantage of the program were parents of
children attending private, religious schools did not make the program
unconstitutional as applied.2
Witters v. Washington Departmentof Servicesfor the Blind 2 1 followed on
the heels of Mueller. In Witters, the Court tackled part two (whether or not aid
was distributed indirectly) of its test for discerning whether a program had the
primary effect of advancing religion.'2 In Witters, the Court upheld a program
which provided "vocational rehabilitation assistance" to blind persons.2 2 The
commission supervising the program denied Witters assistance because he was
attending a Christian school.124 Witters challenged the ruling by the commission,
and eventually the Supreme Court granted certiorarito determine whether
providing assistance to Witters would violate the Establishment Clause. 5 The
Supreme Court ruled that such assistance would not violate the Establishment
Clause because any aid to a religious institution would be indirect. 26 The aid
only reached the college after it was channeled through Witters's private choice,
and not as a result of the state sponsoring the institution.'27
The Court finally tied the two-part test of neutrality and indirectness in
Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothillsSchool District.28 In Zobrest, the Court ruled that
a program providing sign-language interpreters to hearing-impaired students
applied to Zobrest, a student attending a Roman Catholic high school. The
program, according to the Court, was both (1) neutral in that it provided
assistance to students in both private and public, sectarian and non-sectarian
schools, and (2) indirect because29the aid flowed to a school through the private
choices of a private individual.

118. Id. at 398.
119. Id. at 399.
120. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983). The Court also explicitly
discussed policy considerations which led it to believe that the program did not violate
the spirit of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 398-402.
121. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
122. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 615 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466

(1998).
123. Witters, 474 U.S. at 483.
124. Id. at 483-84.
125. Id. at 484-85.

126. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs., 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986).
127. Id.
128. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/6
129. Id. at 9-14.
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F. Agostini v. Felton

Agostini marked the culmination of the 1980s and early 1990s cases which
had slowly moved away from constrained notions regarding separation of church
and state. Agostini really began in 1985 when the Court, inAguilar v. Felton,'
struck down a New York program which attempted to send public school
teachers into nonpublic, sectarian schools to provide remedial educational
services to underprivileged youth. 132 The Court remanded the case to the New
York District Court, which issued a permanent injunction barring New York
from instituting the program. 33 Twelve years later, the injunction was
challenged at the Supreme Court in Agostini. In keeping with its prevailing
theme of expansiveness, the Court lifted the injunction and overruled
Aguilar as
3
inconsistent with subsequent Establishment Clause decisions.1 1
In order to overrule Aguilar, the Court dispensed with School District of
GrandRapids v. Ball.'35 The Court noted that Ball struck down a "Shared Time"
136
program very similar to the one at issue in both Aguilar and the present matter.
According to the Court, Ball's "Shared Time" program violated the
Establishment Clause for three reasons.'37 First, the public school teachers could
138
potentially become vehicles for the transmission of a religious message.
Second, the program created symbolic union between church and state that
would be perceived by children as the state endorsing religion. 139 Third, the
program had the impermissible effect140 of "subsidizing 'the primary religious
mission of the institutions affected.",,

The Court overruled Ball because, while the general principles for analysis
(the Lemon test) had not changed since Aguilar, the presumptions upon which
Ball and Aguilar were based no longer applied. 14' The Court identified and
overruled the following two presumptions. First, the Court no longer presumed,

130. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
131. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
132. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 218 (1997) (discussing Sch. Dist. v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1985)).
136. Id. The state provided funds for remedial and "enrichment" classes, taught
by public school teachers, at nonpublic schools. This program was "designed to

supplement the 'core curriculum' of the nonpublic schools." Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. The Agostini Court analogized the Ball program to Meek v. Pittenger,421
U.S. 349 (1975).
139. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 220.
140. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
141. Id. at 222. The Court stated: "What has changed since we decided Ball and
Aguilaris our understanding of the criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an
impermissible
effect." of
Id.Missouri
at 223. School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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as in Meek and Ball, that "the placement of public employees on parochial
school grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored
indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and
religion."' 4 Second, the Court abandoned "the rule ...that all government aid
that directly aids the educational function of religious schools is invalid.' ' 143 In
abandoning these two presumptions, the Court armed itself for the task of
upholding the New York program contested in Agostini.
The Court then adopted two presumptions to be applied in Establishment
Clause challenges, and specifically defined "effect of advancing religion." First,
programs providing assistance to both sectarian and non-sectarian schools
through aid given to persons based on neutral and secular criteria do not create
a financial incentive for persons to attend sectarian institutions.'" Second, even
though a program requires "administrative cooperation" between church and
state or might "increase the dangers of 'political divisiveness,"' these two facts
do not "by themselves... create an 'excessive' entanglement."' 45 Finally, to
effect an advancement of religion, a program must: (1) result in government
indoctrination, (2) "define its46recipients by reference to religion," or (3) create
an excessive entanglement.
The Court ended its discussion of the Establishment Clause inAgostini with the
following statement:
We therefore hold that a federally funded program providing
supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on a
neutral basis is not invalid under the Establishment Clause when such
instruction is given on the premises of sectarian schools by
government employees pursuant to a program containing safeguards
such as those present here. The same considerations that justify this
holding require us to conclude that this carefully constrained program
47
also cannot reasonably be viewed as an endorsement of religion.

142. Id.
143. Id. It is worth noting that the Court cites to Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Servs., 474 U.S. 481 (1986) to support its proposition here. Recall that Witters allowed
the state to provide a grant to a blind student attending a Christian college. The state
analogized this grant to the state issuing a paycheck to an employee who then turns
around and donates the money to a religious institution. The analogy is a stretch at best,
for the state in a paycheck setting receives services from an employee to whom it pays
a wage. In Witters, the state helps pay for the sectarian education of a blind student.
Hopefully, the state is not paying for the sectarian education in the same manner that it
is paying its employees.
144. Id. at 230.
145. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).
146. Id. at 234.
147. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/6
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The Court remarked that "the mere circumstance that [an aid recipient] has
chosen to use neutrally available state aid to help pay for [a] religious education
'
[does not] confer any message of state endorsement of religion"148
G. Conclusion
Looking at the general direction of the Court since Everson, it is likely that
the Court began this "discussion" with a view towards neutrality or evenhandedness. However, the Court was interrupted by jurisprudential hiccups.
The first came in Lemon v. Kurtzman, lasting until Nyquist and Levitt. The
second occurred in Ball and Aguilar. The second hiccup was eradicated in
Agostini,but no decision has specifically overruled the first one. But, beginning
with Mueller and ending with the refusal to grant certiorariin Jackson, the Court
has significantly weakened Lemon andNyquist's no-aid separationism. All that
remains from the first hiccup is a framework within which the Court analyzes the
Establishment Clause, and through which it can implement its current
"evenhandedness" approach to that Clause.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
Relying on the Supreme Court's present interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jackson ruled that the amended MPCP
did not violate the Establishment Clause "because it has a secular purpose, it will
not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and it will not lead to
excessive entanglement between the State and participating sectarian private
schools."'4 9

A. Secular Purpose
The Jackson court, discussing the first prong of the Lemon test, stated that
"courts have been 'reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states,
particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the state's program may be
discerned from the face of the statute."" 5 The court determined that the purpose
of the program was "to provide low-income parents with an opportunity to have
School
their children educated outside of the embattled Milwaukee Public
52
system.'' Jackson said that such a purpose was clearly secular.'

148. Id. (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs., 474 U.S. 481, 488-89
(1986)).
149. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 611 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466

(1998).
150. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983).
151. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 612.
395 (1983)). Repository, 1999
388,Scholarship
463 U.S.
v. Allen,
(citing Mueller
152.byId.
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B. PrimaryEffect ofAdvancing Religion
Next, Jackson asked whether the statute has the primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion. 3 The analysis under the second prong is one of degree.
The question that must be asked and answered is whether there is sufficient
separation between church and state.' 54 To answer this question, the court
engaged in a historical discussion of the criteria used by the Supreme Court in
evaluating government programs benefitting religious schools.' The Jackson
court articulated that the "effect" prong of the Lemon test really consists of two
considerations: (1) whether a program distributes benefits neutrally or equally
among secular and religious schools, and (2) whether the aid is distributed
indirectly to the schools. 5 6 "[S]tate programs that are wholly neutral in offering
educational assistance directly to citizens in a class defined without reference to
religion do not have the primary effect of advancing religion."' 57 The
Establishment Clause was not intended to "inadvertently prohibit [the
Government] from extending its general State law benefits to all its citizens
' 58
without regard to their religious belief.'
The court justified its conclusion that the MPCP is constitutional by
identifying the program's neutrality. First, the selection of both student and
school participants in the program was based on religion-neutral criteria.'" The
153. Id. (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222 (1997); Mueller, 463 U.S.
at 396; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
154. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 613 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998) (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
155. Id.

156. Id.
157. Id. (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993))
("Given that a contrary rule would lead to such absurd results, we have consistently held

that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class 6f citizens

defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause
challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive attenuated financial
benefit.")
158. Id.at 614 (quoting Everson v. Bd. ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1946), which held
that the Establishment Clause does not prevent New Jersey from reimbursing with tax
dollars parents of students attending sectarian schools for their bus fares as part of a tax
benefit program doing the same for all pupils attending both public and other types of
schools). In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Supreme Court stated:

The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has
been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally
established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of these
expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to
exist without sponsorship and without interference.
Id. at 669.
159. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 617 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1993).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/6
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schools could not choose certain students over others, except that preference
could be given to a sibling of a child presently attending that school.'60 Also, the
children could not be required by a school to participate in any religious
activities at the school.16 Furthermore, the amended MPCP provided a standard
amount of aid to the parents of the participating children. This amount did not
vary depending upon the school the children chose to attend. 6 Finally, the most
important benefit of the program was secular in nature-it allowed parents the
opportunity to afford better education for their children. 63 Therefore, the
amended MPCP is neutral because it does not favor or disfavor religion in any
way. 16
The court also identified a number of ways in which the program is indirect.
First, the aid flowed to sectarian institutions only after "numerous private
choices of individual parents of school-age children."' 65 The court stated further:
[T]he program was amended so that the State will now provide the aid
by individual checks made payable to the parents of each pupil

attending a private school under the program. Each check is sent to
the parents' choice of schools and can be cashed only for the cost of
the student's tuition. Any aid provided under the amended MPCP that
ultimately flows to sectarian private schools, therefore, does so "only
as a result of genuinely independent and private choices of aid
recipients."'"
The court acknowledged that the aid checks were sent directly to the school.
But, the school could not cash the checks until endorsed by the parent to whom
the check was made out. The court pointed out that it is irrelevant whether the
aid ends up in sectarian or non-sectarian schools. The real issue is who
determines the ultimate destination of the money. Because private individuals
chose to spend their aid at sectarian schools, rather than at secular schools, the
state did not discriminate on the basis of religion. 67 The court concluded by
stating:
The amended MPCP, therefore, places on equal footing options of
public and private school choice, and vests power in the hands of

160. Id.
161. Id. This is known as the "opt-out" provision of the statute.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 617 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1993).
165. Id. at 618.
166. Id. (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs., 474 U.S. 481, 487
(1986)).
167. Id. at 618-19.
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parents to choose where to direct the funds allocated for their
children's benefit. We are satisfied that the implementation of the
provisions of the amended
MPCP will not have the primary effect of
68
advancing religion.
Jackson also distinguished the MPCP from the program in Nyquist.'69 Rather
than singling out children in private schools as beneficiaries of the program, 7 '
[T]he only financially-qualified Milwaukee students excluded from
participation in the amended MPCP are those in the fourth grade or
higher who are already attending private schools. The amended
MPCP, viewed in its surrounding context, merely adds religious
schools to a range of pre-existing educational choices available to

MPS [Milwaukee Public School] children. This seminal fact takes the
amended MPCP out of the Nyquist construct and places it within the
7

framework of neutral education.1 '

The Jackson court stated that its decision was controlled not by Nyquist, but by
the following line of cases: Mueller v. Allen,' Witters v. Washington
Departmentof Services for the Blind,173 Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothillsSchool
District,'74Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 75and
168. Id. at 619. The court dismisses the argument by Respondents that the law has
the primary effect of advancing religion because a substantial amount of the money from
the program ends up in the accounts of sectarian schools. Id. at 619 n. 17.
169. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
170. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 615 n.9 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
466 (1993).
171. Id.
172. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 614-15 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 40102 (1983). In Mueller,the Court allowed taxpayers to deduct some educational expenses
from their state income taxes, even though most of those utilizing the deductions sent
their children to religious or sectarian schools. Id.
173. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 615 (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs.,
474 U.S. 481 (1986)). In Witters, the Court reaffirmed the principle that the
Establishment Clause is no bar on public aid eventually used at a sectarian institutions
for indirect and neutral purposes. The Court relied on the fact that the aid only went to
the religious institutions because of private individual choices of the recipients of the aid.

Id.
174. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 616 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993), which held that a school district providing a sign-language
interpreter to a deaf student under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act did not
violate the Establishment Clause even though "the interpreter would be a mouthpiece for
religious instruction").
175. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 616 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995),
which upheld university action of giving student organization publication funds even
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/6
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Agostini v. Felton.'76 Relying on the above cases, Jackson perceived that a
program which is both neutral and indirect in its application of aid to sectarian
institutions satisfies the requirements of the Establishment Clause. As the
Jackson court explained:
The Supreme Court, in cases culminating in Agostini, has established
the general principle that state educational programs do not have the
primary effect of advancing religion if those programs provide public
aid to both sectarian and nonsectarian institutions (1) on the basis of
neutral, secular criteria that neither favor or disfavor religion; and (2)
private choices of the individual parents
only as a result of numerous
177
of school-age children.
Jackson concluded that the amended MPCP was "precisely such a program."'7 8

C. Excessive Entanglement between the Church and State' 9
Essentially, this test required the court to determine whether the government
must monitor the amended MPCP closely in order to ensure compliance with the
Establishment Clause.18 0 The court stated that not all interaction between the
government and sectarian institutions unconstitutionally advances or inhibits
religion.' 8' In other words, complete separation between church and state is

though the student organization was a newspaper with a Christian perspective. The Court
allowed this because the key to Establishment Clause analysis is not who receives the
funds, but whether the "state conferred a benefit which... inhibited [or] promoted
religion."). The Establishment Clause requires neutrality, not that state funds never end
up in the coffers of religious organizations. Id.
176. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 616 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997),
which held that a "federally funded program providing supplemental, remedial
instruction on a neutral basis to disadvantaged children at sectarian schools is not invalid
under the Establishment Clause when sufficient safeguards exist").
177. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 617.
178. Id.
179. The Jackson court begins its analysis of the third prong of the Lemon test with
the recognition that the Supreme Court in Agostini merged this third prong with the
second prong, creating an overall "effect" test. Id. at 619 n.18. The court in Jackson felt
more comfortable applying the traditional Lemon test because it determined that this test
was not overruled by the United States Supreme Court, and therefore still controls
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id. at 612 n.5.
180. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 619 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 466
(1998) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
181. Id.
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impossible.'82 Therefore, the court had to determine what kind of interaction
constitutes "excessive entanglement."' 83
The court concluded that the amended MPCP did not implicate excessive
entanglement between church and state. The monitoring required by the statute
was minimal, consisting of "performance, reporting and auditing requirements,
as well as... [compliance with] applicable nondiscrimination, health, and safety
obligations."'" The State Superintendent had to ensure that the quality of
secular education complied with state standards. This was nothing new to the
Superintendent, whose regular duties included a similar monitoring function.'85
The court, therefore, held:
The program does not involve the State in any way with the school's
governance, curriculum, or day-to-day affairs. The State's regulation
of participating private schools, while designed to ensure that the
program's educational purposes are fulfilled, does not approach the
86
level of constitutionally impermissible involvement.
D. Conclusion
The court in Jackson concluded that the amended MPCP was valid because
it complied with the Lemon test. It was both neutral
and indirect and did not
"run afoul" of the criteria articulated in Lemon. 8 7
V. COMMENT
Jackson v. Benson rests on the foundation of Agostini v. Felton and its

predecessors. The Wisconsin Supreme Court was perceptive to point out that it
was controlled not by Nyquist, but by Mueller, Witters, Zobrest, and Agostini.
These cases forged a path away from strict separationism toward
evenhandedness or neutrality.

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 619 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998).
186. Id. at 620. The court cites to Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97
(1989), for the proposition that "routine regulatory interaction which involves no
inquiries into religious doctrine, no delegation of state power to a religious body, and no
'detailed monitoring and close administrative contact' between secular and religious
bodies, does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command."
187. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/6
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A. ChangingNotions of Neutrality ... Back to Everson
The Court has historically operated on a principle of neutrality, demanded
by the relationship between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause in the First Amendment.'88 Neutrality meant that a state could neither
advance religion, nor restrict its exercise by the people." 9 This restrictive
neutrality scrutinized the overall "effect" of a program to see if it advanced
religion in any way. However, the meaning of government neutrality has
evolved over the period of twenty to twenty-five years into an entirely different
concept. This evolution is primarily responsible for the shift in the Court's
perspective to a more expansive interpretation of the "effect" prong of the Lemon
test.
The evolution ironically began in Nyquist. In Nyquist, the Court left open
for later consideration the possibility of a program "involving some form of
public assistance (e.g., scholarships) made available generally without regard to
the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefitted. '"'9 The Court in Mueller v. Allen'9' felt this statement constituted the
Nyquist Court's definition of a neutral program. This development was subtle
but powerful. Instead of being prohibited from taking actions having the effect
of advancing religion, the government was allowed to benefit religion if it also
benefitted similarly situated secular interests. In other words, neutrality came
to be defined as equality.
This shift in the Court's concept of neutrality points back to Everson v.
Board of Education.'92 Everson's definition of neutrality required states to
distribute benefits equally. 93 The following language made that clear: ". . . we
do not.., prohibit New Jersey from extending its general State law benefits to
all its citizens without regard to their religious beliefs."' 94 Lemon' articulated a
much more restrictive view:
Under our system the choice has been made that government is to be
entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches
excluded from the affairs of government. The Constitution decrees
that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family,
and the institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement
and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn.' 95

188. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
189. Walz, 397 U.S. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring).
190. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782
n.38 (1973).
191. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
192. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
193. Id. at 18.
194. Id. at 16.
195. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (citations omitted).
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By the time the Court reached Agostini, the questions about neutrality
centered on whether the program was equally available, irrespective of religion.
B. The Implementation ofNeutrality-Jacksonv. Benson
Jackson is important because of its implementation of a neutrality principle,
and because it set out in coherent fashion the case law developing this principle.
In so doing, Jackson recognized some statements articulated by the Court are a
subterfuge, an attempt to disguise equality-neutrality as something less broad
than it really is. Jackson illustrates this in the following:
A student qualifies for benefits under the amended MPCP not because
he or she is a Catholic, a Jew, a Moslem, or an atheist; it is because he
or she is from a poor family and is a student in the embattled
Milwaukee Public Schools. To qualify under the amended MPCP, the
student is never asked his or her religious affiliation or beliefs; nor is
he or she asked whether the aid will be used at a sectarian or
nonsectarian private school. Because it provides a neutral benefit to
beneficiaries selected on religious-neutral criteria, the amended MPCP
neither leads to "religious indoctrination," nor "creates [a] financial
incentive for students to undertake sectarian education. 96
This conclusion does not follow from the proposition that students are
selected on the basis of religion-neutral criteria. This reasoning illustrates the
nature of the neutrality principle. It shifts the focus away from the overall effect
of the program and instead scrutinizes the application of benefits. As long as
persons of all types of faiths (or persons without any sort of religious ties) are
benefitted, the program is neutral. What this reasoning fails to take into account
is the true effect of the program. No longer are courts concerned with whether
a benefits program, although neutral on its face, has the effect of advancing
religion by providing money to religious schools. The statement that payment
of tuition for students at eighty-nine sectarian schools does not lead to religious
indoctrination is a falsehood. The opt-out clause in the program does not save
the MPCP from this conclusion. The truth be known, the state no longer is
concerned with whether or not its children are being religiously indoctrinated at
its expense as long as (1) the state is not making that choice for the student, and
(2) the state is not preferring one religious group over another.
The other subterfuge present in this statement in Jackson is that there is no
financial incentive to attend a religious school. Again, this is false. The majority
of private schools eligible to participate in the program are sectarian. This
program creates a financial incentive to attend private school in general, and in

196. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 618 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466

(1993) (citations omitted).
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most cases, that financial incentive is for students to attend a religious school.
Instead of utilizing this statement to buttress its analysis, the Jackson court
should have simply argued that it does not matter whether a program creates a
financial incentive to attend a religious school as long as neutral criteria exist for
selecting students and schools for participation in the program.
These two subterfuges illustrate the movement away from an "as applied,"
or a no-aid separationist, Establishment Clause analysis. Facial neutrality is
more important than whether a program like the MPCP has the primary effect
of advancing religion. The second prong of the Lemon test has been phased out.
This renders the Lemon test ineffective in dealing with Establishment Clause
analysis. The purpose of the Lemon test was to prevent three evils: sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.'97

Undeniably, the result of the MPCP is financial support of eighty-nine religious
schools out of one hundred twenty-two private schools eligible to participate in
the program.' 98 Under the traditional Lemon test, such an effect violates the
Establishment Clause. This is no longer true. Financial support of religious
institutions is no longer an evil for purposes of the Establishment Clause.

It was, therefore, only natural for Agostini to reformulate the test. The test,
as it now stands, is (1) whether a program has a secular purpose, and (2) whether
a program has the effect of advancing religion.' 99 To analyze whether a program
has the effect of advancing religion, the Court now looks at three factors: (1)
whether a program results in government indoctrination; (2) whether a program
defines the beneficiaries with religion-neutral criteria; and (3) whether the
program creates an excessive entanglement between Government and religion.2 °°
Notably missing is any requirement which would block financial support of a
religious institution. The reliance by the Jackson court on the Lemon framework
is yet another subterfuge, for the court was operating within the Agostini
opinion's analysis.20'
C. Strict-Separationismor Even-Handedness: Is There a Choice?
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Walz, identified the three evils
which he believed the Establishment Clause should prevent:

197. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
198. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 619 n.17.
199. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). The Court in Agostini does not
mention secular purpose in connection with its summary of the "primary criteria...
use[d] to evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion .... " Id.
But, given that the Lemon test has not specifically been overruled by the Court,
presumably the Court will continue to analyze secular purpose.

200. Id.
201. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 612-20 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
466 (1998).
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[T]he line we must draw between the permissible and the
impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects
the understanding of the Founding Fathers. It is a line which the Court
has consistently sought to mark in its decisions expounding the
religious guarantees of the First Amendment. What the Framers
meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under the Establishment
Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of religious with
secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities
of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for
essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to
serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice. When
the secular and religious institutions become involved in such a
manner, there inhere in the relationship precisely those dangers-as
much to church as to state-which the Framers feared would subvert
religious liberty and the strength of a system of secular government.
On the other hand, there may be myriad forms of involvements of
government with religion which do not import such dangers and
therefore should not, in my judgment, be deemed to violate the
Establishment Clause. 0 2
At this point, the question becomes whether the MPCP draws Wisconsin (a
secular institution) into a relationship prohibited by the Establishment Clause,
at least in Justice Brennan's perspective.
Is Wisconsin's involvement with religious schools serving the essentially
religious mission of religious institutions? This depends upon one's perception
of the religious mission of a religious school. In Levitt, the Supreme Court
relied on a distinction between the secular educational aspect of a religious
school and the sectarian mission of a religious school to buttress its belief that
state financial support of a religious school does not effect the advancement of
religion.2 3 The Court in Levitt felt that it was "left with no choice under Nyquist
but to hold that [the program] constitutes an impermissible aid to religion; this
is so because the aid that will be devoted to secular functions is not identifiable
and separable from aid to sectarian activities."' The inference which follows
is that if the Court could have discerned a mechanism which separated the
sectarian and secular functions of the school such that the program would only
aid the secular function, then the program would have survived the
Establishment Clause challenge. Such a mechanism was put in place by the
New York legislature, and the program was upheld when the Levitt program
came back in Regan.2 5 This distinction is troubling. Neutrality-theory
202. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680-81 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
203. Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
204. Levitt, 413 U.S. at 480.
205. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
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advocates argue that absolute separationism is no longer plausible given the
nature of our world today because separationism assumes that "church-related
social services take place within discrete and clearly defined boundaries easily
segregated from the charitable organization's sectarian beliefs and practices."2 6
Substituting "church-related social services" with religious schools makes for an
interesting analogy." 7 If strict separationists assume that religious schools'
educational function can be separated from their "sectarian beliefs and
practices," then neutrality theorists assume the same thing. Justice Brennan's
first prohibited relationship illustrates the necessity of severing from the religious
orientation of the schools their religious function, for otherwise the MPCP serves
the "essentially religious activities of religious institutions. 2 8
The third prohibition involves the use of religious means to advance
government ends when secular means would suffice.209 Again, to argue that the
MPCP does not use religious means to advance government ends requires
distinguishing between the secular educational function and the religious
orientation of a religious school. The same difficulties inherent in the first
prohibited relationship apply here. But Justice Brennan's description of the third
relationship gives rise to the most troubling of conclusions-the state is using
religious schools to educate the children of Wisconsin when secular schools
would accomplish the same end. Of course, the MPCP was enacted because
secular public schools were not accomplishing the same end. The Milwaukee
Public Schools failed to effectively educate the children in its system. The better
solution for Establishment Clause purposes might be reformation of the public
school system instead of creation of a voucher system allowing children to attend
religious schools at their (or their parents') choosing.
VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Brennan correctly points out that some government involvement in
religion is inescapable." 0 This is especially true in an era where government has
grown to an enormous size, influencing virtually every area of our lives. 2t ' The
challenge lies in identifying those relationships between government and
religious institutions which are acceptable and prohibiting those relationships
which are unconstitutional. The MPCP, for now, is considered by the Supreme

206. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 352-53.
207. Granted, the analogy is not perfect. But I think that church-related social
services/charitable organizations and religious schools share a commonality which makes

the analogy fitting. Both institutions separate themselves from other institutions by their
statement: "We are religiously motivated."
208. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,680-81 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
209. Id. Given that the second prohibited relationship is inapplicable here, I move
to the third.
210. Walz, 397 U.S. at 680-81.
211. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 352-53.
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Court to be an acceptable relationship between Wisconsin and religious
institutions."
Of course, the consequences of the neutrality principle have so far been
beneficial. The fact that governments may now use tax dollars to assist religious
institutions increases vastly the choices people have with regard to schooling,
counseling programs, and other religiously-affiliated programs and institutions.
The hope in Wisconsin is that the MPCP will provide educational opportunities
that would not otherwise be available to underprivileged children. Also, public
schools might be forced to think differently about the way they educate the
children in Wisconsin. There is a desperate need for such reform in the
education of underprivileged children. Nonetheless, one may be concerned
about the means used to effectuate these consequences.
Justice Rutledge, in Everson, articulated similar concerns in his dissent.
Discussing James Madison's perspective on the Establishment Clause, he stated:
Madison opposed every form and degree of official relation between
religious and civil authority. For him religion was a wholly private
matter beyond the scope of civil power either to restrain or to support.
Denial or abridgement of religious freedom was a violation of rights
both of conscience and of natural equality. State aid was no less
obnoxious or destructive to freedom and to religion itself than other
forms of state interference. 'Establishment' and 'free exercise' were
correlative and coextensive ideas, representing only different facets of
the single great and fundamental freedom.... In no phase was he
more unrelentingly absolute than in opposing state support or aid by
taxation. Not even 'three pence' contribution was thus to be exacted
from any citizen for such a purpose.213
Madison, if appropriately characterized by Justice Rutledge, would no doubt
have opposed the MPCP because of its financial support of religious schools.
For now, the Supreme Court is content to allow programs like the MPCP to
survive Establishment Clause analysis. But Justice Breyer's lone dissent in the

denial of certiorariprobably signals to potential litigants that this issue isnot yet
foreclosed.214
In conclusion, the Jackson court illustrates the direction the United States
Supreme Court has been heading since its decision in Everson. It cannot be said
that the Supreme Court has ever advocated strict no-aid separationism. Perhaps
Nyquist was the closest that the Court has come to such a view. But if the
212. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998). The denial of certiorarirepresents tacit support of the program, despite the fact
that such denials technically have no value as precedent.
213. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,40 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
214. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss3/6
(1998).
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Court's present direction is benevolent neutrality, it is appropriate to ask where
benevolent neutrality is taking the Establishment Clause. After all, if states can
now subsidize tuition payments for religious schools, are we not moving a step
closer to a weak Establishment Clause? Or are such questions premature and
alarmist? Many would argue the beneficial effects of the program involved in
Jackson far outweigh any Establishment Clause concerns.
It is not my purpose to try to predict the future. However, we are clearly not
moving toward a stronger Establishment Clause. We as a country must query
whether this is something we want. For now, it appears that such programs, like
the MPCP, present one answer to the growing educational crisis in this country.
But these programs are not the only answer. Careful thought should be given to
the consequences, beyond the stated educational goals, of such programs.
Benevolent neutrality may end up forcing the Nation's courts to draw

increasingly fine and arbitrary lines in a vain attempt to reconcile precedent with
benevolent neutrality. The real question remains whether the Establishment
Clause will be whittled away to nothingness, or whether neutrality and
separation between church and state can co-exist.
BRYAN D. LEMOINE
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